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One hallmark of modern medicine is the ever-rising cost of
providing life-saving or life-extending treatments.  Advances in
medical care and the ability to improve the duration and
quality of life, combined with the expectations of both doctors
and patients that all new modalities of treatment developed
will be implemented in everyday practice, are the major
reasons for modern medicine’s becoming so expensive. In these
circumstances resource allocation decisions need to be made
and appropriate priority-setting processes developed. This
challenge faces all societies but most agonisingly middle-
income countries like South Africa where the expectations of
physicians and patients are geared to the best that can be
achieved in any country — even the wealthiest. 
Expensive, new or established standard treatments that may
benefit patients may be considered in at least two categories.
The first is when each individual patient will be a direct
beneficiary. This applies, for example, when a pacemaker or
orthopaedic prosthesis is installed, when an organ such as a
kidney, heart or liver is transplanted, or when chronic renal
dialysis is initiated. While such treatments have some mortality
and a measure of sub-optimal results, good outcomes are the
rule. 
The second category is when an expensive new or standard
treatment is used to achieve a statistically demonstrable benefit
for a patient population. A characteristic feature of such
treatments is that many patients must be treated to save one
life or prevent one adverse event. Most often it is not possible
to determine in advance, or even retrospectively, to which
patients the benefits accrue. Examples include new drugs for
malignant disease and for such chronic diseases as rheumatoid
arthritis, hyperlipidaemia, hypertension and coronary vascular
disease. The new drug described by Richards and colleagues
(p. 416) for reducing the mortality rate from severe sepsis is
another example. In the case of drotrecogin alfa (Xigris), 16
patients with severe sepsis must be treated at a cost of R55 000
each to save one life. Thus it would cost R880 000 to save the
life of one unidentifiable person. 
Consider the dilemma posed for a public hospital or medical
aid scheme faced with this choice. On the one hand clinicians
seek increased budgets for renal dialysis, pacemaker insertions
and hip prostheses. For example, nephrologists argue that it is
possible to prolong the life of one identifiable patient by renal
dialysis for about R60 000 a year (in the public sector).
Moreover, each such patient will also be given the opportunity
to have a transplant, which will cost about 
R30 000 in the first year with approximate subsequent costs of
R15 000 in the second year and even less each year thereafter.
So if R880 000 were allocated to a renal unit, several
identifiable patients who would otherwise die could be given
many additional years of high-quality life. Similar arguments
can be made on behalf of patients eligible for a pacemaker or
an artificial hip.
On the other hand, the critical care team requests an
additional R880 000 to save the life of one unidentifiable person
over the period of time needed to treat 16 patients with the
new drug. It could be argued that a potentially life-saving
modality should be included in a therapeutic regimen to meet
the rights of all patients who may benefit. Some also contend
that intensivists must have access to new therapies to advance
the quality of practice in the ICU. However, others will
respond that, on the grounds of overall utility and benefit to
society, the additional resources could better be used to
prolong or save the lives of many identifiable persons.
Another version of this debate has played out in the context
of limited resources available for neonatal ICUs. In the columns
of this journal one set of paediatricians argued that the
expenditure of about R20 000 per newborn baby weighing less
than 1 000 g could save 2 244 extra lives each year. However,
7 low-birth-weight babies must be treated to save one life.1
Another group responded that allocating the same expenditure
to babies weighing over 1 000 g who require ICU care could
save the lives of many more babies. 2 If overall benefit to
society and the largest number of needy babies is the standard
for choosing, surely the latter choice is the most justifiable? 
Another example of a tough choice is whether to spend
resources saving a few lives or spending the same resources to
improve the quality of life of many people. Consider the
paucity of facilities to ensure good palliative care at the end of
life — in particular for patients with HIV/AIDS or malignant
disease. Would it not be better to spend R880 000 on improved
palliative care for, say, 100 identifiable patients than to save the
life of one unidentifiable person?   The former choice would
not only reduce the pain and suffering of many people but
could extend life by a few months for several.
These are all difficult choices and require value judgements
in addition to such technical procedures as calculations of cost-
effectiveness and estimates of life-years saved. To facilitate
such decisions in a manner that is both rational and
accountable to the public, Daniels and Sabin have devised a
process that they have called ‘Accountability for
Reasonableness’. This framework requires that a fair priority-
setting process meets four conditions. First, the rationale for
decisions must be publicly accessible.  Second, the decisions
about meeting health care needs must be contextually relevant
to fair-minded people. Third, allowance must be made for
appeals so that previous decisions can be reconsidered in the
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light of new evidence or arguments. Fourth, there must be a
process of enforcement that facilitates the implementation of
the last three conditions. 3
Ideally this process, which ensures fairness, transparency
and accountability, should be used by both public and private
health care providers who together administer the country’s
limited medical resources.  Failing this, resource allocation will
continue to be viewed by doctors, health care administrators
and the public as irrational and potentially subject to hidden
political and interest group manipulation.  Neither will this
flawed type of allocation produce the greatest social benefits
for the largest number of people who need care.   Instead it will
only exacerbate the twin burdens faced by both public and
private health care providers — heightened expectations on the
part of patients unfairly denied benefits, and drastically rising
costs as advocacy groups mount challenges to irrational
medical decision-making.  This outcome would be a formula
for widespread loss of confidence in both public and private
sector institutions, as taxpayers and medical aid members are
called on to bear unsustainable costs for a chaotically
administered health system. 
Explicit, transparent and accountable rationing processes are
not yet being widely used — although there is a growing
tendency to do so in some countries,4 and at least one recent
example has been documented in South Africa. 5 South Africa’s
Constitutional Court has on one occasion approved a hospital
policy, forced by shortages of funding, equipment and
personnel, to limit dialysis for chronically ill patients only to
those eligible for transplants.  All who failed medical criteria
were denied life-saving dialysis.6
Until open, accountable, explicit priority-setting procedures
based on sound scientific data (and a single trial seldom
provides this) and ethically principled criteria become more
widely used, scarce resources will continue to be channelled
towards those patient populations and drug companies who
make the loudest noises and to those medical disciplines most
vociferous about advancing practice in their domain. No
ethical, medical or scientific rationale supports this type of
arbitrary and  unaccountable means of allocating scarce public
or private health care resources.
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A third Perinatal Care Survey workshop was held at the
Hammanskraal campus of the University of Pretoria, 18 - 20
November 2002. Like the previous two, this workshop brought
together the users of the Perinatal Problem Identification
Programme (PPIP), the national and provincial Maternal, Child
and Women’s Health (MCWH) units, the national and
provincial Health Information and Epidemiology units, and the
Medical Research Council (MRC) Research Unit for Maternal
and Infant Health Care Strategies to discuss perinatal care
based on an audit of perinatal deaths in South Africa.
It is not possible at this stage for South Africa to have
confidential enquiries into all perinatal deaths, like the one into
maternal deaths, because of the magnitude of the task. A
solution, however, has been developed whereby the national
basic perinatal data (i.e. data from every site where babies are
born) and data from sentinel sites around the country that have
confidential enquiries into all the perinatal deaths in their
areas, are combined. The basic perinatal data is a minimum
dataset that includes all births and deaths in weight categories.
The data from the sentinel sites add descriptive data of causes
and avoidable factors to the basic perinatal care indices. This
gives a good reflection of the magnitude of the problem of
perinatal care in the country, and also provides information on
why the infants are dying by including details on pathology
and health system failure. The combination of both sets of data
gives a reliable picture of perinatal care in the country and can
direct health workers to areas where the greatest improvements
can be made. The reports published under the ‘Saving Babies’
banner are available for 2000 and 2001 from the National
Department of Health.1,2 The third report, involving 73 sentinel
Reduction in perinatal mortality feasible without incurring
major costs
